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Pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, U S WEST
Communications, Inc. (hereinafter "U S WEST") petitions for rehearing. In this
Petition, U S WEST describes with particularity the points of law and fact that the
Court overlooked or misapprehended in its opinion dated May 12, 1992
(hereinafter "the Opinions-Appendix A). This Petition is presented in good faith
and not for the purpose of delay.

I.

THE COURTS HOLDING IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE EXCEPTIONS
ADOPTED BY THE COURT AND WITH THE REMEDY SOUGHT BY THE
PARTIES.
In the Opinion, the Court adopted an exception to the rule against

retroactive ratemaking relating to "unforeseeable and extraordinary increases or
decreases in expense." (Opinion at 9) The theory underlying this exception is that
"justice and equity require that adjustments be made for unforeseen windfalls
and disasters not caused by the utility." Id.

Thus, "[t]o achieve fairness, the

exception allows the recoupment of such expenses. . . ." Id., emphasis added.
The exception, therefore, allows recovery of the amount of the unforeseen and
extraordinary increase or decrease in expense.
The Court also made it clear that a rate of return is not an absolute limit on
profits:
The rate of return is neither a guarantee of nor a limit on profits. A utility
should be rewarded for becoming more efficient through its own efforts. If
the authorized rate of return were an absolute ceiling on profits, that
objective would be subverted.
Id. at 16, emphasis added.
Yet, despite these principles, the Court held:
[I]f on remand the Tax Reform Act of 1986 is found to have resulted in an
unforeseeable and extraordinary decrease in expenses or if U. S. West is
1

found to have engaged in misconduct, we hold that U. S. West's earnings,
to the extent they exceeded its authorized rate of return established in the
1985 general rate case, should be refunded to U. S. West ratepayers.
Id. at 16, emphasis added. Read literally, the holding would mandate that, if the
unforeseen and extraordinary exception applies in a particular year, all earnings
above the authorized return must be refunded, even if the extraordinary and
unforeseen decrease in expense accounts for only a portion of the excess earnings.
Thus, if a utility earned $10 million more than the authorized return in a
particular year, but only $2 million was attributable to the extraordinary expense
decrease, the Court's holding would seemingly require that the entire $10 million
be refunded. Such a holding is patently unfair, is inconsistent with the Court's
articulation of the exception and the objective of promoting efficiency, and its
application will amount to a penalty rather than recoupment of earnings
attributable to the extraordinary expense.
The holding also goes far beyond what was requested by the parties. In oral
argument before the Commission, Mr. Dryer, counsel for MCI, was asked to
describe what Petitioners were requesting. He gave the following response:
Well, if the Commission were to adopt the argument t h a t this is not
retroactive ratemaking but it's in the nature of reparations, then I believe
the Commission could order a refund of the entire amount due to whatever
factor that exceeded 14.2 percent which was the authorized rate of return.
If, however, the Commission concludes that there is an exception to the
doctrine of retroactive ratemaking for unforeseen events, then I think the
amount would be restricted solely to the unforeseen event which was the
passage of the 1986 Tax Reform Act.
(R. 942, emphasis added)

He later indicated that, if the unforeseen and

extraordinary exception were adopted, the amount at risk "would be narrowly

2

limited to those truly unforeseen events." 1

(R. 943)

Finally, as noted in our Brief, the rule against retroactive ratemaking is
constitutionally based. See Respondents* Brief at 28-29; accord South Central Bell
Telephone Co. v. Louisiana Public Serv. Comm'n. 594 So. 2d 357 (La. 1992);
Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n. 794 R2d 1165, 1170 (Kan. App.
1990). By sanctioning the refund of earnings unrelated to the exception, the
Court's action would violate both the rule against retroactive ratemaking and U S
WEST's constitutional rights.
Similarly, in a situation where "utility misconduct" exists, to the extent the
Court's holding would require the refund of amounts above the authorized rate of
return unrelated to the misconduct, the Court's holding would be unfair, would
be inconsistent with the theory underlying the adoption of the exception, and
would violate U S WEST's constitutional rights.
U S WEST, therefore, requests that the Court rehear this issue and clarify

1

Counsel for Tel-America participated later in the oral argument and did not disagree
with Mr. Dryer's statement. (R. 949 et seq.) Mr. Dryer also made it clear that refunds which
would reduce earnings below 14.2% would be inappropriate and that earnings above 14.2%
attributable to efficiencies and other matters within the control of the utility should be retained by
the Company:
The bottom line is 14.2 percent. That would be the trigger point to analyze the amount in
excess, but it would be our position that if the excess is attributable to efficiencies or other
actions over which the utility had control, then the benefit would inhere to the utility.
(R. 974). In Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns. 680 P.2d 733, 736 (Utah 1984), this Court stated:
In law or in equity, a judgment must be responsive to the issues framed by the pleadings,
and a trial court has no authority to render a decision on issues not presented for
determination. Any findings rendered outsits the issues are a nullity.
£££ Cornia v. Cornia. 546 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah 1976) ("[LJiberality in procedure . . . does not
authorize granting of relief on issues neither raised nor tried.")
3

its holding so that only those earnings above the authorized rate of return
attributable to the events giving rise to an exception to the rule against retroactive
rate making are subject to refund.
II.

THE COURTS RULING ON THE ISSUE OF PETITIONERS' FAILURE TO
RAISE UTILITY MISCONDUCT IN THEIR PETITIONS FOR
REHEARING IS BASED ON A SERIOUS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACT.
Utah Code Ann. Section 54-7-15(2)(b) explicitly states that no party can raise

on appeal any ground not set forth in its petition for rehearing.

In Utah

Associated Municipal Power Systems v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 789 P.2d 298, 300
(Utah 1990), this Court expressly reaffirmed the principle that "an issue is not
preserved for consideration on appeal unless it has been specifically raised in a
petition for rehearing before the PSC."2 (Emphasis added)
In this case, neither Tel-America nor MCI raised the claim t h a t the
Commission erred in failing to hold a factual hearing on utility misconduct in its
petition for rehearing. (R. 685-95) Yet, in their briefs, they raised the issue of
utility misconduct and argued that the Commission erred in not holding such a
hearing. (MCI Brief at 44-45, Tel-America Brief at 22)
In ruling that MCI and Tel-America had satisfied Section 54-7-15(2)(b), the
Court overlooked two important facts in the record that completely undercut the
Court's conclusion.

First, the Court quoted a portion of the Commission's

November 1, 1988 order for the proposition that the Commission only wanted the
parties to address the threshold legal question rather than specific facts relating
to their claim for relief.

(Opinion at 13) This conclusion overlooks another

2 In Utah Dep't of Business Regulation v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 602 P.2d 696, 699 (Utah
1979), this Court held that compliance with Section 54-7-15 is "a jurisdictional prerequisite to the
grant of judicial review by this Court."
4

statement from the November 1, 1988 Commission order. After setting the filing
date for the briefs of parties supporting the Request for Agency Action, the
Commission defined the parameters of their briefs this way:
Those parties making the Request for Agency Action and any intervenors
who support the Request shall file legal memoranda in support of the relief
sought in the Request. (R. 3, emphasis added)
Thus, contrary to the Court's conclusion that the Commission asked the parties to
only address the broad jurisdictional issues, the Commission specifically
requested that they support their specific requests for relief. Second, the Court
compounded this error by stating that the parties, in their briefs filed below,
"focused on the legal issue whether the Commission had authority to grant any
relief in light of the EBA case and not on the facts that might support any
particular theory justifying relief." (Opinion at 13, emphasis added) The Court's
conclusion that the briefs did not focus on facts that would support the misconduct
theory is simply not supported by the record. In fact, MCI's Brief before the
Commission contained a detailed factual recitation (R. 378-88) that served as the
basis for the argument that "there is evidence to indicate that the Company has
been less than forthcoming in providing sufficient information . . ." (R. 399) and
to claim that "Mountain Bell actively frustrated the regulatory process" and
"failed to advise the Commission that its earnings had exceeded its authorized
rate of return." (R. 415) MCI made specific assertions of misconduct in its Brief
in support of its specific claim that U S WEST should be estopped from relying on
the rule against retroactive ratemaking. 3

In response, U S WEST presented a

3 In fact, the heading of the final section of MCI's Brief states: "Mountain Bell Should be
Estopped from Raising the Rule Against Retroactive Ratemaking." (R. 415)
5

detailed factual discussion and a specific response to the allegations of
misconduct. (R. 469-85)
Having specifically raised the issue before the Commission and having failed
to raise it in their petitions for rehearing, the issue was not preserved by MCI and
Tel-America as required by Section 54-7-15. Because the Court's decision was based
on a serious misapprehension of fact, U S WEST respectfully requests the Court to
rehear this issue and rule, consistent with the explicit requirements of Section 54-715, that the misconduct issue was not preserved.

Because this issue was not

preserved, the Court should reconsider its decision which appears to have been
heavily influenced by unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct.
III.

THE COURT CONCLUDED THAT THE PROCEDURES FOLLOWED BY THE
COMMISSION IN APPROVING REVENUE REDUCTIONS IN 1987 AND
1988 WERE IRREGULAR,
THIS CONCLUSION IS BASED ON
MISAPPREHENSIONS OF BOTH LAW AND FACT.
The Opinion states that the procedures followed by the Commission in

approving the December 1987 tariff reduction and the 1988 stipulation were
"irregular, if not illegal." (Opinion at 10) The Court also stated that "the fixing of
utility rates by private negotiation with no findings of fact raises serious questions
about the legality and integrity of the procedures the Commission employed." Id. at
11. There are two problems with this conclusion. First, the orders approving both
decreases are final and were not appealed by any party.

Second, the Court's

criticism of the procedural basis for the 1987 and 1988 rate reductions is unfounded,
both factually and legally.
With regard to the 1987 reduction, the Court characterized it as a
"stipulation" between U S WEST and the Division. Id. at 4. While the Division

6

supported the reduction, such a characterization is incorrect since there was no
stipulation between U S WEST and the Division.

Procedurally, the reduction

resulted from the filing by U S WEST of revised tariffs for five services 4 that had the
overall effect of lowering annual revenues by $9.02 million. (Appendix B). No party
opposed the tariff reduction.5 Since the tariffs involved only rate reductions, the
statute governing the filing was Section 54-7-12(4)(a):
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this title, any schedule,
classification, practice, or rule filed with the commission that does not result
in any rate increase shall take effect:
(i) 30 days after the date of filing; or
(ii) within any lesser time the commission may grant, subject to its
authority after a hearing to suspend, alter, or modify that schedule,
classification, practice, or rule.
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-12(4)(a) (1987),6 emphasis added. Section 54-7-12(4)(a) does
not require a hearing to approve the kind of filing made by U S WEST, If the
Commission is not required to take any action before a utility-proposed rate
decrease takes effect, obviously there is no need for it to make findings regarding
the decrease.
The October 1988 rate reduction in Docket No. 88-049-07 was much more than
a private negotiation between two parties. In fact, it was a detailed stipulation

4

The five services were residential basic exchange service, residential installation
charges, long distance service, OUTWATS, and switched access service (which is the service
purchased by MCI and Tel-America).
5

Both MCI and Tel-America were fully aware that U S WEST was proposing these tariff
reductions - including a 35% reduction to U S WEST's rates to them - and did not oppose them.
(See Appendix 12 to Respondents' Brief, at 2-3).
6

Section 54-7-12(4)(a) has been amended slightly since 1987; however, the changes to it are
not substantive in nature.
7

entered into by nine of the ten parties to the proceeding, including U S WEST, the
Division, Tel-America, and MCI. 7 (R. 916-27) While the Committee of Consumer
Services did not sign the Stipulation, it affirmatively stated that it did not object to
it. 8

This Stipulation and the Commission's Order did not end the rate case.

Rather, they placed two rate decreases into effect pending full hearings in the
matter, thus allowing significant rate decreases to become effective in the absence
of a fully litigated proceeding. 9 Had the parties not entered into the Stipulation,
those reductions would have been significantly delayed. Thus, from the perspective
of ratepayers, it is inappropriate to criticize the Commission's procedures,
particularly when considered in light of Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-1, which states in
part:
(1) Informal resolution, by agreement of the parties, of matters before
the commission is encouraged.

7 The other signatories were Contel, a large independent local exchange carrier, the
Exchange Carriers of Utah, an association representing all independent local exchange carriers
in Utah, the Utah Telecommunications Management Association, a trade group representing
larger users, and AT&T and U S Sprint, large interexchange carriers.
8 In the October 13, 1988 Order approving the Stipulation, the Commission noted that a [t]he
Stipulation was entered by all parties to this proceeding, with the exception of the Committee of
Consumer Services which stated that it had no objection to the Stipulation." (R. 912; emphasis
added) Neither that order nor the final order in Docket No. 88-049-07 was appealed by the
Committee or any other party.
9

It is inappropriate to negatively contrast the terms of the August 1988 stipulation to the
October 1988 stipulation. While the August stipulation would have reduced rates by an additional
$5 million, it would also have completely resolved all revenue issues in the case and put in place
an incentive regulation plan, under which no further rate reductions would have been made until
1992. On the other hand, the October stipulation put in place rate reductions without resolving the
rate case. Indeed, the rate case continued, with additional revenue reductions of $22 million in
1989. It should also be remembered that the October 13 rate reduction took place only four months
after the Division initiated the proceeding. In fully litigated proceedings prior to the amendment
to section 54-7-12(3) to allow interim rate reductions, rate decreases would not normally be
effective until much longer periods of time had elapsed since the filing.
8

(2) The commission may approve any agreement after considering
the interests of the public and other affected persons.
(3)(a) At any time before or during a hearing or proceeding before the
commission, the parties, between themselves or with the commission
or a commissioner, may engage in settlement conferences and
negotiations.
(b) The commission may adopt any settlement proposal of the
parties and may enter an order based upon the proposal.
The Commission's approval of the Stipulation, which had no opposition, was in full
compliance with Section 54-7-1 and with prior precedent. In Utah Dept. of Admin.
Services v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 658 P.2d 601, 613 (Utah 1983) rWexpro HI. this
Court strongly supported the policy of encouraging settlements of controversies
before regulatory agencies "since it avoids the delay and the public and private
expense of litigation."
The Court's Opinion creates a "Catch 22" for the entire rate process before the
Commission. On the one hand, the Court was highly critical that the 1987 and 1988
reductions were not based on detailed findings, which would have required detailed
testimony and extensive hearings. On the other hand, the Court was even more
critical of the Commission for not acting more expeditiously in reducing U S
WESTs earnings. The two criticisms are inconsistent. Comprehensive hearings,
detailed findings, full discovery and all the other attributes of due process require a
great deal of time. Rapid action, on the other hand, requires parties to compromise
their positions. In this case, the Commission's approval of the rate reductions
provided benefits to ratepayers far faster than would have otherwise been achieved.
To have required the Commission to fully develop the record in order to enter
detailed findings would have delayed and utterly frustrated that effort. Because the

9

Court's ruling appears to mandate such an approach, U S WEST respectfully
submits that it will cause profoundly negative impacts to the regulatory process.
An issue related to the Court's criticism of the Commission's procedures is
the inference that the Commission acted far differently than other regulatory
commissions in dealing with the Tax Reform Act of 1986. In its Opinion, the Court
stated that "[b]y August 1987, utility regulators in forty-three states and the District
of Columbia had taken some action to reduce utility rates in response to the Act."
(Opinion at 3) The clear implication of the Court's statement is that by August 1987
rates had been reduced in forty-four regulatory jurisdictions in response to the Tax
Reform Act. A further implication is that the Utah Commission, which was not
one of the jurisdictions listed, was derelict in its duties. The source for the Court's
statement was a Public Utilities Fortnightly article provided by MCI. (R. 111-18)
That article and its detailed footnotes make it clear that in many of the jurisdictions
reported, no rate reductions had taken place and that such changes would be
considered in the context of the normal rate-making process. 10 That is no different
from the Utah Commission's handling of the matter. Furthermore, in many of the
states, the rate reductions occurred only with regard to those utilities that were
currently in general rate proceedings.

Few of the rate reductions related to

telephone companies, and those that did primarily involved companies in the midst
of rate proceedings. The Utah Commission's actions were consistent with those of

10 Arizona, for example, was listed as one of the forty-four jurisdictions. The footnote
associated with Arizona states, in part: "No substantive action yet taken. The effect of TRA86 will
be dealt with in the context of the general rate case proceedings of the state's larger investor-owned
utilities." (R. 115, note 4)
10

many other jurisdictions. 11
A major premise of the Court's decision is t h a t the Commission's
procedures were improper and inadequate. Since that premise is not correct, U S
WEST requests that the Court reconsider its decision. In addition, U S WEST
requests that the Court explicitly clarify its decision by reaffirming its Wexpro II
position encouraging the informal resolution of matters before the Commission.
IV.

THE COURTS UNRESTRICTED ADOPTION OF THE EXTRAORDINARY
AND UNFORESEEABLE EXPENSE AND UTILITY MISCONDUCT
EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE AGAINST RETROACTIVE RATE MAKING
VIOLATES U S WESTS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND CREATES A
CLOUD ON U S WESTS ABILITY TO FINANCE.
U S WEST has received and reported earnings in 1987 and 1988 based upon

final Commission rate orders that were not appealed by any party. U S WEST
argued that it could not be deprived of those earnings without violating the due
process provisions of the state and federal constitutions (Respondents' Brief at 2829), but acknowledged in oral argument that a showing that

U S WEST had

defrauded the Commission could operate as an exception to this constitutional
prohibition. The Opinion does not address this constitutional argument.
Because it is unconstitutional and a violation of statute to order a utility to
refund revenues collected pursuant to a final rate order (Respondents' Brief at 2331), any exception must be strictly drawn. While it is conceivable that an "act of
God/' such as a severe storm, which occurs and is concluded before there is any
reasonable possibility for prospective rate relief, might constitute an appropriate

11

The Public Utility Fortnightly article makes no effort to analyze or describe the
difference in state laws in each jurisdiction. The law in a particular state can have a dramatic
effect on the remedies available to a regulatory agency in dealing with situations like the Tax
Reform Act.
11

exception, an event like the Tax Reform Act which altered tax rates prospectively
on a continuing basis is not an appropriate exception.
Likewise, the Opinion's adoption of a "misconduct" exception to the rule
against retroactive ratemaking is overly broad.

U S WEST has conceded

throughout this case that revenues collected pursuant to a final order would be
subject to refund to the extent t h a t they were based upon

fraudulent

misrepresentations or omissions by the utility. The three cases cited in the Opinion
all involved allegations of fraudulent conduct. The "utility misconduct" exception
adopted by the Court does not define "misconduct" or require a finding of intent on
the part of the utility, and is, therefore, so vague as to violate the due process rights
of a utility. In addition, it cuts only one way. If a party seeking lower rates than
supported by the utility is successful in achieving its aims through fraudulent
misrepresentation or omission, the rates ought to be subject to surcharge.
The Court's failure to precisely and narrowly define its exceptions to the rule
against retroactive rate making seriously impairs the constitutional protection of
the rule.
Furthermore, if the rule against retroactive rate making is to have as many
potential loopholes as these overly broad and vague standards would suggest, it is
hard to imagine a situation in which anyone can rely upon the finality of a rate
order. As pointed out in our brief (Respondents' Brief 29-31), it is in the interests of
the utility, its customers and its investors to have finality in rate orders. The lack of
finality created by the opinion is particularly problematic for utility investors. As
noted in Indiana Tel. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 171 N.H2d 111, 124 (Ind. App.
1960) and State ex rel. Standard Oil of Calif, v. Den't of Public Works. 53 P.2d 318,
12

319 (Wash. 1936), a public utility's ability to attract capital or make investments is
seriously undermined if final rate orders are subject to adjustment after-the-fact.
For the foregoing reasons, U S WEST requests that the Court reconsider its
adoption of the two exceptions to the rule against retroactive rate making. If the
Court concludes that the exceptions should be adopted, U S WEST respectfully
requests that the Court define the exceptions more precisely and narrowly to limit
the potential for their misapplication. U S WEST requests the opportunity to brief
this issue further.

V.

THE COURTS CONCLUSION THAT ALL CUSTOMERS SHOULD BENEFIT
FROM ANY REMEDY IS ERRONEOUS.
The Opinion concludes that a [a]ny refund of excess earnings that might be

appropriate . . . must not be solely for the named petitioners; all of U.S. West's
ratepayers are entitled to the benefit of any remedy the Commission finds to be
appropriate." (Opinion at 16) The only support in the Opinion for this striking
result is the reference that "MCFs and Tel-America's petitions for rehearing stated
that they were filed for and on behalf of all petitioners and all customers of U. S.
West." Id. at 14. Although the Court's observation about the petitions for rehearing
is correct (R. 684, 694), the mere assertion by Tel-America and MCI, who are
interexchange carriers and competitors of U S WEST, that they were acting in a
representative capacity on behalf of all ratepayers, does not grant them that status.
To act in a representative capacity, a person must either have statutory
authority to do so or must have complied with Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil
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Procedure. 1 2 Rule 23 prescribes the procedures that must be followed if a party
wishes to act in a representative capacity. See Workman v. Nagle Construction. 802
P.2d 749, 753 (Utah 1990). Neither Tel-America nor MCI ever purported to comply
with these requirements.

Rule 23 applies to Commission proceedings.

Utah

Admin. Code R750-100-1.G.
The conclusion of the Opinion that all U S WEST ratepayers are entitled to
the benefit of any remedy was not briefed or argued by the parties and is based upon
a misapprehension of both law and fact. U S WEST respectfully requests that the
Court grant rehearing to correct this error.
CONCLUSION
The Opinion effects far-reaching changes in the regulation of public
utilities in this state based upon a serious misapprehension of both law and fact.
Without the benefit of appeal or briefing of the issues involved in a series of rate
reduction orders of the Public Service Commission, the Court concluded that U S
WEST achieved excessive earnings as a result of the Commission's failure to
respond to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and fashioned a remedy consistent with
that erroneous conclusion. It is respectfully submitted that the Court erred in
considering issues not properly before it and in modifying principles of law which
have served the state well for many years. U S WEST respectfully requests that

12 Here, the only parties statutorily authorized to act in a representative capacity are the
Committee, the Division, and the Commission. Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-4-1 et seq.. 54-4a-l(l)(b) & 5410-4(3). Although the Committee joined in the Request for Agency Action, it did not file a
memorandum or present argument below and it did not join in the appeal of the Commission's
order. The Division, which is charged with representing the general public interest, did appear
and opposed the Request below and on appeal. The Commission's order was the subject of this
appeal, and the Commission appeared in defense of its order.
14

the Court rehear the case and correct these errors.
Dated this 26th day of May 1992.

v ^A^^Luy^\^LA>jtJL
Ted D. Smith

9?7<w^
'GregiM-y Ej(Monson
Attorneys for U S WEST
Communications, Inc.
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STEWART, Justice:
In 1985, the Public Service Commission (Commission)
granted Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co-, now U.S.
West Corp. (U.S. West), 1 a $22 million general rate increase
and established 14.2% as its authorized rate of return on
equity- In granting the increase, the Commission assumed that
U.S. West would pay a federal corporate income tax of 46%, the
then-existing rate.
On October 22, 1986, Congress enacted the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 (Act), which provided a two-step reduction in the
federal corporate income tax rate, from 46% to 40% effective
June 1987, and then to 34% effective January 1988. This
amounted to a total reduction of aproximately 26%.
In December 1986, the Commission requested^that the
major utilities in the state provide it with information
showing the anticipated effect of the reduced income tax rates
on their earnings. The president of U.S. West responded that
although the initial impact on cash flow would be negative,
"the tax law is a critical factor in averting rate requests.11
He further stated, "Considering all of the data, I feel very
good about the possibility of rate stability for our customers
over the next few years. The benefits of the 1986 Tax Reform
Act will go to ratepayers since they work to offset intrastate
increases in our continuously changing industry." In January
1987, the Commission requested that the Utah Division of Public
Utilities (Division) review the responses of the companies.
The Division recommended that the Commission not order U.S.
West to reduce its rates. The Commission then directed the
Division to undertake a formal investigation of U.S. West / s
rate of return.
The Committee of Consumer Services (Committee) was
created by the Legislature to serve as "advocate . . . of
positions most advantageous to a majority of residential
consumers." Utah Code Ann. § 54-10-4(3) (1990). On June 1,
1987, the Committee filed a motion with the Commission asking
it to declare the rates of all public utilities subject to the
Commission's jurisdiction interim rates or, alternatively, to
require them to establish refund reserve accounts from which
excess earnings could be refunded to ratepayers. The
Commission denied the motion on June 30, 1987, referring in
part to the Division's report that U.S. West's rate of return
for 1986 and 1987 would be less than 13% and 12% respectively,
less than its authorized rate of 14.2%. The Division
represented that the net effect of the Act on U.S. West's
earnings would be an increase of $1.2 million in 1987 and $0.5
1. Mountain Bell became U.S. West Corp. in 1988. We will use
the name "U.S. West" throughout this opinion for ease of
reference.
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million in 1988. The Division also reported that it was
monitoring U.S. West's earnings on a monthly basis and would
alert the Commission to any significant changes.
By August 1987, utility regulators in forty-three
states and the District of Columbia had taken some action to
reduce utility rates in response to the Act.
On August 11, 1987, the Committee requested that U.S.
West disclose its earnings. U.S. West objected on the ground
that the Division was already monitoring its earnings. The
Committee then moved to compel U.S. West to respond to the
request for data. The Commission ruled in November 1987 that
the motion to compel would be held in abeyance pending
completion of the Division7s investigation, .but that in the
meantime the Division should give the Committee the financial
information it had obtained from U.S. West.
On September 1, 1987, the Division filed a second
report with the Commission indicating that U.S. West's rate of
return remained below its 14.2% authorized rate of return.
Again, the Division recommended that the Commission take no
action.
The Division's conclusions appear to have been
seriously in error. U.S. West's actual rate return had
exceeded its authorized rate of return in six of the first
eight months of 1987, even though the first phase of the
federal tax reduction was not effective until June 1987. Data
furnished by U.S. West to MCI Telecommunications Corporation in
September 1988 in response to interrogatories provided the
following monthly breakdown for U.S. West's return on equity
for its Utah intrastate operations:
Month
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

1987

1988

12.02%
15.14%
3.52%
15.00%
16.62%
17.86%
16.24%
25.31%
20.76%
17.24%
19.89%
24.48%

17.23%
15.62%
22.04%
16.23%
12.29%
16.02%

As is evident from these figures, U.S. West's rate of return
increased dramatically after the first phase of the tax reduction became effective. For the last six months of 1987, U.S.
West's average monthly rate of return on equity was over 20%.
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In December 1987, the Division and U.S. tyest privately
negotiated a $9 million reduction in future rates to be
effective January 1, 1988. The Commission approved the
stipulation without a hearing or findings of fact to justify
the amount of reduction and without disclosing what U.S. West's
earnings had been in 1987, what they would likely be in 1988,
or by how much they exceeded the authorized rate of return.
Subsequent events disclosed that the $9 million
reduction was inadequate to reduce U.S. West's earnings to its
authorized rate of return. U.S. West's high rate of earnings
continued for the first six months of 1988. During that
period, its average monthly earnings were in excess of a 16%
rate of return, even with the January 1987 rate reduction.
Thus, U.S. West's earnings significantly exceeded its
authorized rate of return for each of the twelve months
following the effective date of the first phase of the tax
reductions under the Act.
On January 28, 1988, the Committee requested that U.S.
West produce the financial data on which the $9 million rate
reduction was negotiated. This request was made after the
second phase of the tax reduction became effective. U.S. West
responded that it considered the investigation closed and
refused to disclose the data. The Committee then hired an
independent consulting firm to review both the settlement and
U.S. West's earnings. In May 1988, the firm issued a report
asserting that the $9 million stipulated rate reduction was
"clearly inadequate."
In July 1988, the Commission initiated a general rate
case, docket No. 88-049-07, to investigate the reasonableness
of U.S. West's rates and earnings. Again the Commission denied
the Committee's request to declare U.S. West's rates interim
rates. Instead, the Commission ruled that if U.S. West's
earnings were in excess of its authorized rate of return, they
would beT.subject to a rebuttable presumption that they were
unjust and unreasonable and subject to refund. In August 1988,
the Division, the Committee, and U.S. West stipulated to a
further rate reduction of $31 million, a $20 million reduction
to be effective September 1, 1988, and an $11 million reduction
to be effective January 1, 1989.
On September 22, 1988, the Commission, with no
findings of fact, rejected the stipulated reduction and ordered
an interim rate reduction of only $27 million, $16 million of
which would be effective August 1, 1988, and $11 million of
which would be effective January 1, 1989.
Then, in October 1988, the Commission, at U.S. West's
request, vacated its September 22 order reducing rates by
$27 million—again with no findings of fact—and instead
approved a stipulation for a permanent reduction of
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$26 million, $16 million to be effective September 22, 1988,
and $10 million to be effective January 1, 1989. The
Commission, also at U.S. West's request, vacated its August 2
order declaring that earnings in excess of U.S. West's
authorized rate of return were presumptively unjust and
unreasonable and subject to refund. In addition, the parties
agreed that there would be no further demands for interim rate
decreases pending the conclusion of the general rate case, and
the Commission approved the agreement, again without findings.
Finally, one year later, in October 1989, after formal
hearings and extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law,
the Commission entered still another rate reduction order of
almost $22 million to be effective November 15, 1989.
Thus, over a period of approximately two years, the
Commission entered three orders reducing U.S. West^s rates in a
four-step process by a total of $57 million. The reductions
were apparently due, at least in part, to the fact that the Tax
Reform Act had decreased U.S. West's federal tax liability,
thereby increasing its earnings to a level significantly in
excess of its authorized rate of return.
While the Commission was considering the stipulation
on which the October 1988 rate reduction was based, David
Irvine, a U.S. West ratepayer and former PSC Commissioner,
filed a request for agency action, asking the Commission to
(1) investigate U.S. West's rate of return for the years 1987
and 1988, and (2) order U.S. West to refund to the ratepayers
all earnings exceeding the 14.2% authorized rate of return.
The Commission subsequently granted MCI Telecommunications
Corp. (MCI) , Tel-America of Salt Lake City, Inc. (Tel-America) ,
and other interested parties, including a number of members of
the Utah Legislature, leave to join in the request.
The Commission severed the request for agency action
from the:%g£neral rate case and assigned the request for agency
action docket tto. 88-049-18. The Commission denied the relief
sought by the requestr. Although the Commission found that U.S.
West's earnings had exceeded its authorized rate of return for
the period in question, it did not state by how much. It did
state, however, that the Tax Reform Act was a cause of the
overearnings. The Coiamission ruled that it had no authority to
order a refund because a refund would constitute retroactive
rate making in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4(1) and
Utah Department of Business Regulation v. Public Service
Commission. 720 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986).
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), Utah
Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l to -22 (1989), establishes the
appropriate standards of review. UAPA applies to all agency
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adjudicative proceedings commenced on or after January 1,
1988. Id. § 63-46b-22(l).
The primary issues to be resolved are whether the
Commission erred in (1) ruling that there is no applicable
exception to the rule against retroactive rate making for
unforeseeable and extraordinary events, and (2) ruling that
there was no basis for a factual inquiry into whether U.S. West
engaged in misconduct by presenting misleading information on
actual and projected earnings or by improperly avoiding
disclosure of its earnings. Both issues are questions of law,
subject to de novo review. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (d) ;
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 754
P.2d 928, 930 (Utah 1988).
II.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE PROHIBITION AGAINST
RETROACTIVE RATE MAKING

As a general proposition, a utility's recoupment of
costs that were greater than projected or revenues that were
less than projected from future rates constitutes retroactive
rate making. The leading case in this" jurisdiction prohibiting
retroactive rate making is Utah Department of Business
Regulation v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 420 (Utah
1986) [hereinafter EBA]. Utah Power & Light Co. had
established an energy balancing account (eba account), an
accounting device created to facilitate interim rate increases
to compensate for rapidly escalating fuel costs. Utah Power
transferred greater than expected revenues that had accrued in
the eba account to general revenues. The purpose of the
transfer was to benefit the stockholders. If left in the eba
account, the increased revenues would have benefited the
ratepayers. Utah Power argued that the transfer was an
accounting adjustment, not retroactive rate making, that the
ratepayers would reap a windfall if the unexpected revenues
remained in the eba account, and that, even with the transfer,
Utah Power -shareholders would receive a lower return on equity
(13.25%) than the authorized rate (16.3%).
The Court held that Utah Power could not transfer the
unanticipated increased revenues out of the eba account to
benefit the stockholders. The Court stated that in a general
rate proceeding utility rates are fixed on the basis of
projected costs and revenues for a future "test" year.
Although the Legislature had specifically authorized interim
rate increases to adjust for rapidly increasing fuel costs in a
bob-tailed rate proceeding, the Court held that the utility
could not recoup lost earnings caused by costs greater than
projected or by revenues less than projected in the prior rate
case. The Court reasoned that "neither the pass-through
legislation nor the Commission's general grant of regulatory
authority permits a utility to have retroactive revenue
adjustments in order to guarantee shareholders the rate of
return initially anticipated." EBA, 720 P.2d at 423.
M^C
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The Court explained that the prohibition against
retroactive rate making is designed to provide utilities with
an incentive to operate efficiently. For that reason,
utilities are not allowed to recoup unanticipated costs or
unrealized revenues.
This process places both the utility and
the consumers at risk that the rate-making
procedures have not accurately predicted
costs and revenues. If the utility
underestimates its costs or overestimates
revenues, the utility makes less money.
By the same token, if a utility's revenues
exceed expectations or if costs are below
predictions, the utility keeps the
excess.
Overestimates and underestimates
are then taken into account at the next
general rate proceeding in an attempt to
arrive at a just and reasonable future
rate.
EBA, 720 P.2d at 420-21 (citations omitted). Therefore, "[t]he
bar on retroactive rate making makes no exception for missteps
in the rate-making process," even though the projections of
expenses and revenues for the test year will necessarily vary
from actual experience. Id. at 424.
A.

Exception For Extraordinary and Unforeseeable
Expenses or Revenues

MCI and Tel-America acknowledge the general rule
against retroactive rate making, but argue that the instant
case falls within an exception that applies when an
unforeseeable event results in an extraordinary increase or
decrease in expenses or revenues.
A number of courts have recognized the exception for
unforeseeable and extraordinary increases in a utility's
expenses. Increased expenses from natural disasters, such as
extreme weather conditions, and other extraordinary events are
the typical bases for the exception. See, e.g., Office of
Consumer Advocate v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n. 428 N.W.2d
302, 306-07 (Iowa 1988) (one-time assessment for permanent
storage of nuclear waste under Nuclear Waste Act of 1982 was
extraordinary, unforeseeable expense); Narraaansett Elec. Co.
v. Burke, 415 A.2d 177, 178-80 (R.I. 1980) (extraordinary ice
storm); In re Green Mountain Power Corp., 519 A.2d 595, 597-99
(Vt. 1986) (unscheduled shutdown of nuclear plant extraordinary
expense) ; Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Public
Serv.. Comm'n. 298 N.W.2d 205, 212 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (severe
ice storm); Re Kansas City Power & Light Co., 75 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 1, 38-41 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1986) (severe ice
storm); Re Kansas City Power & Light Co., 55 Pub. Util. Rep.
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4th (PUR) 468, 480-81 (Mo, Pub. Serv. Comm. 1983) (power outage
caused by interruption of water supply to boiler). In Green
Mountain Power, the Vermont Supreme Court explained the
rationale for the exception:
"If this treatment is not to be permitted,
not only would there be a serious question
as to whether the Company has been
afforded a fair opportunity to earn a
reasonable rate of return, it would also
imply the need for an upward revision of
the rate of return in all cases in the
future. Such a revision, of course, would
have to be based on a prediction of
inherently unpredictable events—the
occurrence of extraordinary plant
shut-downs."
The Board's conclusion was correct.
Once it is clear that a particular cost is
"extraordinary" and that it does not
result from company mismanagement,. or
imperfect forecasts, treatment of such
costs through appropriate amortization in
future rate determinations does not
constitute a "true-up" of past calculations, because a truly extraordinary cost
by definition would not be factored into
the original rate*
Green Mountain Power, 519 A. 2d at 597 (citations omitted)
(emphasis in original) (quoting Order of Vermont Public Service
Board); accord Burke, 415 A.2d at 178-79.
The exception has been applied not only to
unforeseeable and extraordinary increases in expenses, but also
to unforeseeable and extraordinary decreases in expenses. See,
e.g. , Re Narragansett Elec. Co. , 57 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
549, 558 (R.I. Pub. Utils. Comm. 1984) (excess earnings due to
"unanticipated economic recovery and unforeseeable weather");
see also Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. Public Serv.
Common, 514 A. 2d 1159, 1170 (D.C. 1986) (reimbursement of
license contract payments previously paid to AT&T); Turpen v.
Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n, 769 P.2d 1309, 1332 (Okla. 1988) (AT&T's
reimbursement to subject utility was unexpected windfall).
The extraordinary and unforeseeable nature of the
expenses recognized under the exception differentiates them
from expenses inaccurately estimated because of a misstep in
the rate-making process, such as the inability to predict
precisely, or from mismanagement. An increase or decrease in
expenses that is unforeseeable at the time of a rate-making
proceeding cannot, by hypothesis, be taken into account in
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fixing just and reasonable rates. Furthermore, because the
increase or decrease must have an extraordinary effect on the
utility's earnings, the increase or decrease will necessarily
be outside the normal range of variance that occurs in
projecting future expenses.
If a rate-making body were to attempt to make
allowance for an unforeseeable and extraordinary increase or
decrease in expenses in fixing rates, a task that by definition
is impossible, the resulting rates would always be unjust and
unreasonable, if not confiscatory or exploitive, as to either
ratepayers or stockholders. To achieve fairness, the exception
allows recoupment of such expenses either in future rates or in
some other appropriate fashion.
The rule stated in the EBA case is a sound rate-making
principle, but it only applies to "missteps in the ratermaking
process." It does not apply where justice and equity require
that adjustments be made for unforeseen windfalls or disasters
not caused by the utility. We emphasize that the exception for
unforeseeable and extraordinary events cannot be invoked simply
because a utility experiences expenses that are greater or
revenues that are less than those projected in the general rate
proceeding.
In the instant case, the Commission held that the rule
against retroactive rate making barred any relief sought by the
request for agency action and that no exception to the rule was
applicable. The Commission did not specifically state,
however, whether there was an exception for unforeseeable and
extraordinary expenses. We now hold that the exception for
unforeseeable and extraordinary increases or decreases in
expenses is recognized in this state.
We also hold that the Commission's refusal to allow
petitioners a factual hearing on whether the exception applies
was error-. The extent of the reduction of corporate income tax
rates under the Act was clearly unforeseeable when the last
general rate case was decided in 1985. Ordinarily, changes in
tax laws are not a sufficient basis for invoking the exception
to the general rule. Here, however, the federal corporate
income tax rate was cut by more than one-fourth. As the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
commented in connection with the Act, "The change in [Carolina
Power & Light Company's] tax costs at issue here was caused by
an act of Congress (one only marginally more foreseeable than
an act of God)." Carolina Power & Light Co. v. FERC. 860 F.2d
1097, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
U.S. West, the Division, and the Commission argue that
the Act was foreseeable and that "the Commission and the
Division foresaw the potential impact of the [Act] and acted
responsibly in attempting to deal with it." The Commission,
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however, did not foresee the Tax Reform Act in the general rate
case in 1985. In factr that case assumed a federal tax rate of
46%.
Moreover, it appears that the Commission seriously
misappraised the effect of the Act after it was enacted, as
evidenced by the gross inadequacy of the 1987 rate reduction.
There is even doubt that the Commission accurately foresaw the
effect of the Act in 1988 when it agreed to a $26 million rate
reduction, and only a few months later, to another $20 million
reduction. Even if we agreed with the Commission that it
foresaw the effect of the tax reduction and took action to
remedy it in 1987, it is clear that the Commission did not
understand the full effect of the Act with sufficient clarity
to remedy U.S. West's overearnings. Whether that failure was a
result of U.S. West's failure to disclose relevant financial
data and projections promptly should be explored on, remand•
Not only did the Commission fail to foresee the effect
of the Act, but there is significant evidence, at least on this
record, that the Act provided an extraordinary decrease in U.S.
West's expenses and a corresponding extraordinary increase in
earnings.
Furthermore, whether the Commission and the Division
acted responsibly in attempting to deal with the effects of the
Act, as the Commission asserted, is problematic. The
Commission's procedural handling of U.S. West's excessive
earnings in the 1987 and 1988 rate reductions was irregular, if
not illegal. The only explanation given by the Commission for
the 1987 and 1988 rate reductions is found in its order denying
the amended request for agency action, where the Commission
stated that U.S. West ,fearn[ed] in excess of its authorized
rate of return in calendar years 1989 and 1988," and the only
explanation the Commission has given for the overearnings is,
"One- of the reasons for the over-earning was the impact upon
U.S. West: of the Tax Reform Act of 1986." These explanations
are clearly inadequate. The Commission has never indicated
what U.S. West's actual earnings and rate of return were for
the years in question, by how much its actual rate of return
exceeded the authorized rate of return, what rate of return the
1987 and 1988 rate reductions were intended to produce, why the
reductions were stretched out over three steps, whether the
reductions were intended to reduce U.S. West's earnings to the
level authorized in the December 1985 general rate case or to
some other level, or whether the Commission allowed U.S. West
to offset the decrease in taxes by increases in other expense
items not associated with the Act.
The Commission sought to explain its delayed response
to U.S. West's overearnings by stating that the Division
initially indicated that its analysis of U.S. West's financial
data would reveal off-sets to the income tax reduction and it
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suggested no need for Commission action. The Commission
stated, M [T]he Division made a good faith effort to accurately
and correctly analyze the information provided to it by the
utility.11 That finding begs the question whether U.S. West
promptly disclosed sufficiently specific and accurate financial
information, a question the Commission has not addressed.
Moreover, the fixing of utility rates by private
negotiation with no findings of fact raises serious questions
about the legality and integrity of the procedures the
Commission employed. The Commission serves a crucial role in
protecting ratepayers from overreaching by entities with
monopoly power that provide essential services. We have on
many occasions emphasized that the Commission must make
appropriate findings of fact to justify rate orders. In Utah
Department of Business Regulation v. Public Service Commission,
614 P.2d 1242, 1245 (Utah 1980), we stated that the first
prerequisite of a rate order is that it be preceded by a
hearing and findings. We explained:
A state regulatory commission, whose
powers have been invoked to fix a
reasonable rate, is entitled to know and
before it can act advisedly must be
informed of all relevant facts.
Otherwise, the hands of the regulatory
body could be tied in such fashion it
could not effectively determine whether a
proposed rate was justified.
Id. at 1246. Although Department of Business Regulation dealt
with an effort to increase rates, the same principle applies
here, where the Commission acted to decrease rates. In that
case, we emphasized the importance of adherence to proper
procedures and specifically condemned procedures of the type
employed here:
In summary, there is no provision in
the Public Utilities Act which precludes
the authority of the P.S.C. to conduct an
abbreviated proceeding to adjust a utility
rate or charge, but any rate so adjusted
must be predicated upon a finding that
such adjusted rate is just and
reasonable. In turn, this finding must be
supported by substantial evidence
concerning every significant element in
the rate making components (expense or
investment) which is claimed by the
applicant as the basis to justify a rate
adjustment.
Id. at 1249-50.
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Service Commission, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986), we stated
that the Commission cannot discharge its statutory
responsibilities without making findings on both ultimate and
subordinate issues of fact. Once again, we emphasized that the
Commission's regulation of public monopolies must strictly
adhere to those procedures designed to give appropriate
protection to the interests of ratepayers, investors, the
utilities themselves, and where they exist, competitors. Id.
Moreover, unless the Commission complies with those procedures,
this Court cannot perform its assigned task of judicial
review. Id. ; Mountain States Legal Found, v. Utah Public Serv.
Common/ 636 P. 2d 1047, 1058 (Utah 1981).
Here, the Commission issued two orders that reduced
U.S. West's rates by a total of $35 million with no findings of
fact on either subordinate or ultimate factual issues
pertaining to the reasonableness of the reduction or to the
reasonableness of the rates that went into effect after the
reduction. Given the sequence of the Commission's orders and
rate reductions, it seems highly likely that the first two
reductions were not sufficient to offset the effect of the
reduced income tax rate. In any event, it appears that by
reducing the rates in a three-step manner the Commission
allowed U.S. West to collect excessive rates and earnings, at
least until all the reductions finally went into effect.
On remand, the Commission should make factual findings
on all relevant issues. Its findings must, at a minimum,
include (1) U.S. West's earnings and rate of return for the
years 1986, 1987, 1988, and 1989 and the earnings and profits
that would have been realized but for the stipulated rate
reductions in 1987 and 1988; (2) the extent to which U.S.
West's earnings exceeded the authorized rate of return in 1987,
1988, and 1989, both with and without the stipulated rate
reductions; (3) the amount of the decrease in U.S. West's
federal corporate income tax liabilities for the years 1987,
1988, and i989 as a result of the decrease in the federal tax
rates compared with what U.S. West's tax liabilities would have
been under the federal corporate income tax rates in effect in
December 1985; (4) the amount, if any, of increased expenses or
decreased revenues that were offset against U.S. West's tax
savings in negotiating the 1987 and 1988 rate reductions and
whether they should have been allowed under the EBA case to
"true up" past projections; and (5) whether U.S. West was
cooperative, accurate, and forthright in the information
provided and representations made to the Committee, the
Division, and the Commission, including its initial
representation by the president of U.S. West as to the expected
effect of the Act.
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B- Utility Misconduct as an Exception to
the Rule Against Retroactive Rate Making
Petitioners also argue that the rule against
retroactive rate making does not bar a refund of earnings
obtained as a result of utility misconduct and that the
Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in not holding a
hearing on whether U.S. West was guilty of misconduct in not
providing timely, accurate, and specific information as to its
actual or projected earnings for 1987 and 1988.
Before addressing the substantive issues, we address a
procedural question. The Commission, the Division, and U.S.
West argue that petitioners failed to raise in their petitions
for rehearing the issue whether the Commissipn erred in failing
to hold a factual hearing on the allegation that U.S. West
engaged in misconduct. Under Utah Code Ann. § 54-7rl5(2)(a)
and (b) , an issue must be presented to the Commission in a
petition for rehearing to be raised on appeal.2 See
Hi-Country Homeowners Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 779 P.2d
682, 683-84 (Utah 1989); Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 754
P. 2d 41, 46 (Utah 1988); Utah Dep't of Business Regulation v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 602 P.2d 696, 699 (Utah 1979).
In response to the petition for agency action, the
Commission issued an order on November 1, 1988, which stated,
"It is contemplated by the Commission that the parties will
address in their legal memoranda the threshold issue of whether
the Commission has the legal authority to grant the relief
requested . . . ." Petitioners' memoranda accordingly focused
on the legal issue whether the Commission had authority to
grant any relief in light of the EBA case and not on the facts
that might support any particular theory justifying relief.
Neither side argued factual issues in that context. The
Commission ruled, as a matter of law, that the rule against
2.

Section 54-7-15 states in part:
(1) Before seeking judicial review
of the commission's action, any party
. . . who is dissatisfied with an order of
the commission shall meet the requirements
of this section.
(2) (a) After any order or decision
has been made by the commission,
any party to the action or
proceeding . . . may apply for
rehearing of any matters
determined in the action or
proceeding.
(b) No applicant may urge or
rely on any ground not set forth
in the application in an appeal
to any court.
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retroactive rate making governed and that there was no
applicable exception to that rule. The Commission stated, "We
would agree that certain exceptions to the rule are reasonable;
for example, where it could be demonstrated that the utility
had misrepresented important ratemaking information or
otherwise misled regulators." The Commission concluded,
however, that there was no factual basis for that exception,
although the Commission had held no factual hearing on the
issue and the parties were not allowed to focus specifically on
the factual basis for the exception.
MCI's and Tel-America's petitions for rehearing stated
that they were filed for and on behalf of all petitioners and
all customers of U.S. West. They both asserted, inter alia,
that the Commission erred in ruling that the rule against
retroactive rate making barred any relief and that the
Commission's order denying relief was arbitrary and^
capricious. We conclude that petitioners adequately raised the
issue of utility misconduct and that the issue is properly
before this Court.
A utility that misleads or fails to disclose
information pertinent to whether a rate-making proceeding
should be initiated or to the proper resolution of such a
proceeding cannot invoke the rule against retroactive rate
making to avoid refunding rates improperly collected. The rule
against retroactive rate making was not intended to permit a
utility to subvert the integrity of rate-making proceedings.
See Southwest Gas Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 474 P.2d 379,
383 (Nev. 1970) . If a utility misleads the Commission or the
Division by withholding relevant rate-making information, the
rates fixed by the Commission cannot be based on reasonable
projections of the utility's revenues and expenses. The rule
against retroactive rate making was designed to ensure the
integrity of the rate-making process, not to shelter a
utility's improperly obtained revenues.
Moreover, the Commission has the inherent power to
reopen a rate order if a utility engages in misconduct. In re
Minnesota Pub. Util. Commission's Initiation of Summary
Ivesticration. 417 N.W.2d 274, 280-82 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); see
also State ex rel. Corbin v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 693 P.2d 362
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
The Commission stated that the Division's analysis of
U.S. West's earnings was "complicated during the time period in
question by changes in the U.S. West accounting system, delays
in preparation of U.S. West's budget, swings in monthly earning
reports, etc." That finding, however, does not address whether
U.S. West acted forthrightly and made timely and accurate
information available to the Division, the Commission, and the
Committee so that each could accurately analyze U.S. West's
actual and projected earnings. Significantly, the Commission's
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finding does not explain why the rate of return figures finally
provided by U.S. West pursuant to MCI's interrogatories evaded
disclosure for so long. The Commission's explanation is simply
inadequate under the circumstances. In this regard, it is
significant that the $9 million rate reduction negotiated by
the Division and U.S. West and approved by the Commission was
characterized by an independent consulting firm as "clearly
inadequate." That characterization was substantiated, at least
to some degree, by the subsequent $26 million stipulated rate
reduction a mere ten months later.
We conclude that given the facts appearing on the
record and the allegations made by MCI and Tel-America to the
Commission, the Commission's failure to hold a factual hearing
on the issue of utility misconduct was arbitrary and
capricious. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (iv) (1989).
III.

REFUNDS AND REPARATIONS

U.S. West argues that petitioners have no remedy in
the form of reparations under Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-20
because the availability of reparations is limited by
§ 54-4-4, which states that rates found to be just and
reasonable under that section are to be "thereafter observed
and in force." 3
Section 54-4-4, however, does not preclude a remedy in
this case. If the rates charged by U.S. West fall within an
exception to the rule against retroactive rate making in this
case, they are not just and reasonable.
Finally, petitioners argue that an authorized rate of
return imposes an absolute legal ceiling on a utility's profits
and that all profits in excess of that rate are refundable. As
a general proposition, we disagree. An authorized rate of
return is intended to be an estimate of the return on equity
that investors would require before they would invest in the
3. U.S. West relies on American Salt Co. v. W.S. Hatch Co.,
748 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1987), for the proposition that the
Commission has no authority to grant reparations where a
utility has charged rates that have been previously approved by
the Commission. American Salt is inapposite. There, we held
that the Commission was without authority to grant relief from
a previously approved tariff rate because an application for a
special commodity rate was not made prior to the hauling in
question. Therefore, the Commission's order requiring American
Salt to pay the tariff rate was not disturbed. The case stands
for the proposition that in the motor common carrier context,
the Commission may not grant relief from an approved tariff
rate where an application for a special commodity rate is not
made prior to the hauling. It does not stand for the general
proposition U.S. West urges.
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utility. The rate of return is neither a guarantee of nor a
limit on profits. A utility should be rewarded for becoming
more efficient through its own efforts. If the authorized rate
of return were an absolute ceiling on profits, that objective
would be subverted.
Nevertheless, if a utility earns profits in excess of
its authorized rate of return because of an exception to the
rule against retroactive rate making, the authorized rate is
the best available measure of a fair return and earnings in
excess of that rate are subject to refund. Accordingly, if on
remand the Tax Reform Act of 1986 is found to have resulted in
an unforeseeable and extraordinary decrease in expenses or if
U.S. West is found to have engaged in misconduct, we hold that
U.S. West's earnings, to the extent they exceeded its
authorized rate of return established in the" 1985 general rate
case, should be refunded to U.S. West ratepayers. Any refund
of excess earnings that might be appropriate, whether by' way of
reparations, refund, or credit against future rates, must not
be solely for the named petitioners; all U.S. West's ratepayers
are entitled to the benefit of any remedy the Commission finds
to be appropriate.
Reversed and remanded.

WE CONCUR:

Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice

Richard C. Howe, Associate
Chief Justice

Christine M. Durham, Justice

ZIMMERMAN, Justice:

(Concurring)

I join the majority opinion, but write only to make
explicit what I consider the underlying concern of the majority.
Today, we inform the Commission that the EBA decision
does not preclude a retroactive adjustment of rates where they
are either too high or too low as a result of an extraordinary
and unforeseeable circumstance. The EBA case still prohibits
retroactive rate making to address missteps in the rate-setting
process or the normally occurring unexpected events that may
lower or raise rates of return over time. Like the majority, I
am unsure that even the tax changes' very large impact on the
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utility's income warrants invocation of the "extraordinary and
unforeseeable" exception to the ban on retroactive rate
making. However, the Commission should at least-consider the
issue.
The profoundly troubling aspect of the matter before
us is the inexplicable failure of the Division and the
Commission to do their statutorily mandated jobs in the face of
overwhelming evidence that the utility had made, and unless the
Commission took remedial measures solely within its authority
would continue to make, profits far beyond those anticipated at
the time of the proceeding which set the current utility rates
charged consumers. At almost every turn, the conduct of the
Commission and the Division raises serious questions about
whether the regulatory authorities—which state law charges
with seeing that utility rates provide a fair but not
exorbitant rate of return—were shirking the duty imposed upon
them by law to check profiteering by the utility. I realize
that these are harsh words, but from the record before us," it
is difficult to reach any other conclusion.
Today's decision provides the" Commission with a tool
to deal with truly extraordinary and unforeseeable
circumstances that impact the profits of a utility. Our
decision also attempts to ensure that the Commission does the
public's business in the open and that it explains in detail
the rationale for its actions. However, nothing we can do can
guarantee a vigorous and effective regulation of monopolistic
utilities. That responsibility rests with the Commission.
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APPENDK B
ORDER OF DECEMBER 10,1987
DOCKET NO. 87-049-T35

- ' < . -^

- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -

•X

"O
In the Matter of the Application of MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY
for Authority to File Revised
Tariffs Reducing Annual Revenues by $9.02 Million on
less than 3 0 days Notice

CASE NO, 87-049-T35
ORDER APPROVING ACCELERATED
EFFECTIVE DATE FOR REVISED
TARIFFS

By The Commission:
On

December

Telegraph Company
revised

tariffs

7,

1987, Mountain

("Mountain
reducing

requested that the

Bell")

customer

Commission

filed
rates

accelerate

States

Telephone and

with

the Commission

by

$9.02 million and

the

implementation of

such tariffs to December 22, 1987.
Mountain

Bell

represents

follows from the informal
Commission and

the reduction proposal

earnings investigation

ordered by this

conducted by the Division of Public Utilities with

the cooperation of Mountain Bell.
based upon

that

actual results

The tariff

of operation

rate revisions are

for 1987. Approximately

78% of the reductions go to residential customers.
It appearing that
proposed rate

there

is

good

cause

to

allow the

revisions to be implemented prior to the expiration

of the 30-day statutory notice period at Section 54-3-3, Utah Code
for the

benefit of Mountain Bell's customers, the Commission will

make the following order:
ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS
tariffs

with

the

rate

HEREBY ORDERED,

That the revised

reductions detailed therein and filed by

Mountain Bell in this matter be and are hereby made effective from

CASE NO, 87-049-T35
- 2 December 22,

1987. Any person desiring to protest such effective

date shall file protest with the Commission prior to that date.
DATED in Salt Lake City, Utah this 10th day of December,
1987.

Brent H. Cameron, Commissioner

Jam£& M. Byrne, Commissioner
Attest:

Stephen C. Hewlett, Commissiion Secretary

